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The Impact of E-Commerce Strategies on Firm Value: 




Managers would like to understand which strategies generate value in e-commerce 
environments, and researchers are just beginning to explore this issue. Which strategies 
are useful and which are not? In a step towards answering this question, we estimate the 
impacts of several competitive strategies on the value of Amazon.com, the well-known 
Internet retailer, during its first 1000 days as a publicly traded firm. The strategies 
analyzed include pricing, offline expansion, alliance formation, product line expansion, 
and service improvement. The results provide insight into the usefulness of various ways 
of competing online and could be useful for strategic planning in new Internet ventures. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Managers are often uncertain about the impacts of their competitive strategies on the 
value of their firms, but this problem is exacerbated when firms enter new environments 
in which managers have little information about demand and other market conditions. 
One such environment is the e-commerce environment. The rapid growth in the number 
of firms that perform some of their tasks online and compete in the e-commerce 
environment makes it increasingly important to understand which strategies work in this 
new environment and which do not. 
To provide insight into the impact of e-commerce strategies on firm value, we 
apply event study methodology to analyze strategies announced by Amazon.com, the pre-
eminent Internet retailer, during its first 1000 days as a publicly traded firm. We focus on 
five types of strategies that are of particular interest in the e-commerce environment: 1) 
pricing strategy; 2) offline expansion, particularly customer service center, distribution 
center, and regional expansion; 3) promotional alliance formation and online advertising; 
4) product line expansion and service improvement through alliances or acquisitions; and 
5) product line expansion and service improvement without alliances or acquisitions. 
The results yield several insights. First, Amazon.com’s pricing strategy, which 
began with price discounts and has included more creative devices such as allowing web 
surfers to tip websites, appears to reduce Amazon.com’s value. Bertrand price 
competition games suggest that price competition is one of the least profitable ways to 
compete, and Amazon.com’s experience reinforces this claim. Second, Amazon.com’s 
early domestic offline expansions of customer service and distribution centers have 
positive effects on value but its more recent expansions appear to have negative effects.   4 
This suggests that Amazon.com’s offline expansion was excessive. Third, Amazon.com’s 
early promotional alliances with prominent portals have large positive effects on its 
value, but promotional alliances following its early ones appear to have no effect on its 
value. This suggests that promotional alliances are useful early on in an e-commerce 
firm’s life cycle to build awareness of the firm and its products but that they have limited 
usefulness later on. 
The results suggest that, overall, Amazon.com’s efforts to expand its product line 
and improve its services increased its value, but the positive effects can be linked to a 
relatively small number of extremely successful acquisitions, alliances, products, and 
services. Music, health and beauty products, and videos are among the most valuable 
product line expansions, and auctions, 1-Click ordering, Amazon.com’s 
Recommendations Centers, and zShops are among the most valuable service 
improvements.
1 The alliance with the highest estimated abnormal return is with Borders 
Group, one of the two largest offline bookstore chains. Amazon.com uses its online 
capabilities to operate an online bookstore for Borders Group. 
As far as we are aware there are no other studies that use event study 
methodology to comprehensively assess a firm’s strategies in a new environment such as 
the e-commerce environment. Previous authors have studied several types of strategies 
using event study methodology. These include advertising (Chauvin and Hirschey, 1993), 
alliances (Chan et al. 1997), capital expenditures (McConnell and Muscarella, 1985), 
joint ventures (McConnell and Nantell, 1985), mergers and acquisitions (Jennings and 
Mazzeo, 1991), new product introductions (Chaney et al. 1991), and R&D (Chauvin and 
Hirschey, 1993; Sundaram et al. 1996).
2 These studies employ a cross sectional approach   5 
and estimate the average effects of announcements on the sample firms’ stock returns. In 
contrast, we follow a single firm over time. Examining several categories of strategies 
allows us to compare different strategies and show how the effectiveness of some 
strategies changed over time as Amazon.com and its markets evolved. 
Amazon.com 
Amazon.com was founded as an online bookstore in July, 1995 and went public 
in May, 1997 (Nasdaq: AMZN). Since then it has become the most prominent Internet 
retailer. Amazon.com has added several products including electronics, health and beauty 
products, housewares, kitchenwares, music, tools, toys, videos, and several services such 
as auctions, 1-Click ordering, and zShops. Amazon.com has expanded nationally and 
internationally and now operates several customer service and distribution centers in the 
United States and international web sites customers in Europe and Japan. 
There are several reasons for focusing on Amazon.com in this study. First, 
Amazon.com is an excellent example of a firm entering a new environment in which the 
impacts of competitive strategies on value were difficult to assess in advance. Second, 
Amazon.com has always announced its major strategies publicly on its web page, and the 
business press has followed Amazon.com’s activities and fortunes very closely. Thus, it 
is possible to construct a comprehensive list of Amazon.com’s key strategic decisions in 
each of the categories described above.
3 Further, we can be confident that the market was 
informed about Amazon.com’s changes in strategy. 
Third, Amazon.com is interesting in its own right, not only because it was the first 
major Internet retailer, but also because it has had a fascinating experience in the stock 
market so far. Figure 1 shows Amazon.com’s adjusted daily closing price over its first   6 
1000 days of trading compared to the S&P 500 Index, where both are normalized to 
begin at one. Amazon.com went public in May, 1997, and at its peak in December, 1999 
it was valued at 61.70 times its closing price on its first day of trading, but by March, 
2001 Amazon.com’s value had declined to 9.69 times its initial price. By contrast, the 
S&P 500 Index at its highest point was 1.84 and finished at 1.50.  
Fourth, the lessons learned from analyzing Amazon.com may be applied to other 
Internet ventures. Stock prices of e-commerce firms are volatile and often seem to 
fluctuate for no reason, so measuring the impacts of strategies on value is particularly 
useful in this setting. Estimating how Amazon.com’s strategies affected the market’s 
assessment of its value will help us understand the forces shaping competition between e-
commerce firms. 
2. Methodology 
Amazon.com’s web site lists all of Amazon.com’s press releases for its entire history. We 
collected the dates of all of the announcements in each of the five categories referred to in 
the introduction for Amazon.com’s first 1000 days of trading. Focusing on these 
categories is useful because they are of particular importance in the e-commerce 
environment. The categories contain essentially all of Amazon.com’s major 
announcements. Most of Amazon.com’s other announcements do not pertain to strategy 
formulation (for example, an announcement that Amazon.com has just served its 
millionth customer is not an announcement of a strategy). 
In a few cases, multiple announcements within the five categories occur on the 
same day or on adjacent days. In these cases we count only one event, put the event date 
on what appears to be the most important event’s date, and describe the events together in   7 
the table associated with the major event, with the minor event mentioned in brackets. 
Counted this way, there are 85 events in the sample. The tables presented below 
summarize the information that Amazon.com reveals that pertains to each event. 
We use Amazon.com’s adjusted daily closing prices to construct a daily returns 
series for Amazon.com from May 16, 1997 until May 3, 2001, and we use the S&P 500 
Index to construct market returns. Both series are from Reuters and are provided online 
by Yahoo! Finance. There are 999 observations on returns. The standard deviation of 
Amazon.com’s stock returns is 0.064, which implies that daily returns of plus or minus 
5% are well within the range of ordinary fluctuations and daily returns must be plus or 
minus at least 12.8% in order to be in the tails of the distribution.
4 Partly because of this, 
most of the estimated effects reported below are statistically insignificant even when the 
point estimates suggest that the effects on value are quite large. 
  Preliminary data analysis established that the market begins responding to 
Amazon.com’s announcements two days in advance, and the announcement typically 
appears in the Wall Street Journal the day after it is posted on the web page. Therefore, to 
estimate the announcement effects we use an event window that includes the two days 
prior to the announcement day and one day after: [-2,1]. Some of the event windows 
overlap because some announcements are made less than three days apart. To estimate 
the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) of each event given this problem we use two 
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where  it R  is Amazon.com’s stock return on day t,  mt R  is the market return on day t,  j d  
is a dummy variable that takes the value one during event j’s event window,  t ε  is the 
error term on date t, and α , β , and the  j γ ’s are the estimated coefficients. In this 
method, the t test of the significance of event j uses the t statistic of  j γ . To compute the 
CAR of event j, we multiply  j γ  by four (the length of the event window). This 
parsimonious specification avoids double counting abnormal returns when event 
windows partially overlap and facilitates joint hypothesis tests. The R-squared is .28 with 
999 observations. The estimated constant term  000039 . − = α  with a standard error of 
.0022 and Amazon.com’s estimated  00 . 2 = β  with a standard error of .15.
5 
The second method computes CAR the standard way (as described by MacKinlay, 
1997). We delete periods covered by the event windows from the sample, estimate the 
market model by regressing  it R  on  mt R , and compute the CAR of an event by summing 
the forecast errors during its event window. In this case the number of observations used 
to estimate the market model is 680, the R-squared is .18,  00026 . − = α  with a standard 
error of .0021, and  03 . 2 = β  with a standard error of .17. The coefficients of the market 
model are similar in the two methods, and the results below confirm that when the event 
window of an event does not overlap with another, both methods lead to essentially the 
same results. However, when the event window of an event does overlap with another, 
the results are sometimes quite different. The second method double counts the abnormal 
returns whenever two event windows overlap, but in some cases the results appear to be 
more reasonable. 
  Many of the effects are imprecisely estimated – only 16 are statistically   9 
significant. Despite this, a relatively clear picture of the impact of Amazon.com’s 
strategies on its value emerges when we look at categories as a whole. For example, 
Table 1, which describes Amazon.com’s pricing strategies, shows that every CAR except 
one is negative. Thus, even though each individual effect is imprecisely estimated and 
may be doubted, the weight of the evidence suggests that Amazon.com’s pricing strategy 
has reduced its value. 
3. Results 
The tables group events into categories of strategies: 1) pricing strategy; 2) customer 
service center, distribution center, and regional expansion; 3) promotional alliance 
formation and online advertising; 4) product line expansion and service improvement 
through alliances or acquisitions; and 5) product line expansion and service improvement 
without alliances or acquisitions. Each table lists events in the category and includes 
related follow-up events. When we report joint hypotheses tests and summary statistics 
we use the coefficients from method 1. Both methods yield similar conclusions. 
Pricing Strategy 
Table 1 lists Amazon.com’s announcements of changes in its pricing strategy over its 
first 1000 days. The first three events are announcements of price discounts. The point 
estimates suggest that these discounts reduced Amazon.com’s value. It is possible that 
Amazon.com learned from these early effects, because Amazon.com’s pricing strategy 
after these events is more creative, although it still does not appear to increase value. 
  It is difficult to reach conclusions about Amazon.com’s pricing strategy because 
the estimates in Table 1 are all imprecise. The null hypothesis that all of the effects in 
Table 1 are zero cannot be rejected at the 10% level of significance (Wald test statistic   10 
2.47, 10% critical value 12.02). However, the point estimates tend to point in the same 
direction, and the CAR of all seven events in Table 1 (∑
∈ p J j
j CAR , where  p J  is the set of 
events in Table 1) is -.35. Therefore, in our discussion we assume the effects are 
negative, attempt to explain why, and consider implications for other e-commerce firms. 
Price competition has long been thought to be a potential problem for online 
retailers. Traditional bricks and mortar retailers differ by location, and game theoretic 
models of horizontal product differentiation show how location differences allow firms to 
charge higher prices even when the goods sold are identical in all other ways. In the 
absence of location differences, simple models predict that producers of identical goods 
engaged in price competition obtain zero profits unless one has a cost advantage (see 
Tirole, 1988 for a formal presentation of these results). Partly for this reason, 
manufacturers often have an incentive to provide local monopolies to their retailers (for a 
discussion see Carleton and Perloff, 1994). The Internet removes this source of product 
differentiation. This is critical in cases like Amazon.com’s where the products sold are 
not differentiated from those of other retailers (books, compact disks, and so on). Like 
other firms, e-commerce firms can obtain above-normal profits only if they obtain lower 
costs than their competitors or differentiate by providing better services and 
complementary product lines that are not easy to imitate. 
In the absence of cost advantages, price reductions are easily imitated, leading to 
price wars that lower everyone’s profits and provide no one with a relative advantage.
6 
Ghemawat (1999, Case 9) shows that Amazon.com’s first price cut in Table 1 (6/10/97) 
was part of a price war with Barnes & Noble’s online site that began before 
Amazon.com’s initial public offering. As noted in Table 1, on 5/17/99 Amazon.com’s   11 
price discounts on New York Times bestsellers provoked an immediate response from the 
book superstores Barnes & Noble and Borders, who both matched Amazon.com’s 
discounts. Thus, Amazon.com obtained no relative advantage by lowering its prices. 
  The estimates suggest that Amazon.com’s more recent pricing innovations have 
not been more successful than its early price reductions. One example is the Honor 
System, which allows web surfers to tip their favorite web sites. Amazon.com used this 
technology to implement a virtual tip jar that allows customers to tip their favorite 
musicians when they download MP3 tracks. Although this is a creative pricing strategy, it 
does not appear to have increased Amazon.com’s value. As shown below, investors 
reacted more favorably to service and product line enhancements. 
Customer Service Center, Distribution Center, and Regional Expansion 
Table 2 lists announcements of Amazon.com’s domestic customer service center, 
distribution center, and regional expansion, and Table 3 lists announcements of foreign 
expansion. Amazon.com’s strategy in these areas has consisted of continual domestic 
expansion to cut shipping times accompanied by international expansion to serve non-
English speaking consumers, partly through foreign distribution centers. 
Amazon.com’s early domestic expansion had a positive effect on its value. The 
null hypothesis that Amazon.com’s first two domestic distribution center expansions had 
no impact on value is rejected at the 10% level (Wald test statistic 5.60, 10% critical 
value 4.61). The CAR of these two events is .36. In contrast, the null hypothesis that 
Amazon.com’s domestic expansion after its first two centers had no impact on value 
cannot be rejected at the 10% level (Wald test statistic 2.47, 10% critical value 12.02). 
The point estimates suggest that the CAR of these events is negative: -.33.   12 
The main benefit of domestic expansion is that it improves delivery times. The 
results suggest that investors believed that the marginal improvements in delivery times 
from distribution center expansion were worth the cost early on, but that more recently 
this has not been the case. This is a reasonable conclusion. The Delaware center 
(11/18/97) provided better access to East Coast customers and publishers. The Nevada 
center (1/7/99) reduced shipping times to key markets in the western United States by a 
full day. The expansion that followed led to smaller improvements and, although the 
terms of leases are not disclosed, the cost may have been higher because the more recent 
centers are larger. 
The results suggest that e-commerce firms should avoid excessive offline 
expansion. Results presented below suggest that e-commerce firms would be better off 
investing in service improvements that make shopping easier and more informative. It 
may not be possible to expand product lines without increasing the number and size of 
the customer service and distribution centers, but if it is possible to do so then that is what 
should be done. Perhaps items that are physically small or have high value for their size 
should be emphasized. Another possible strategy is to expand with flexible leases to 
avoid committing the company to large overhead expenditures. 
Table 3 suggests that Amazon.com’s expansion into Europe, French-language 
markets, and Japanese-language markets increased value, but the effect is imprecisely 
estimated. The null hypothesis that Amazon.com’s foreign expansion had no impact on 
value cannot be rejected at the 10% level (Wald test statistic 4.12, 10% critical value 
9.24). The point estimates suggest that foreign expansion has been beneficial: the CAR of 
the events in Table 3 is .21. Foreign expansion improves delivery times but differs from   13 
domestic expansion because it provides access to markets that would be untapped 
otherwise, and the positive effect might be due to market expansion. 
Promotional Alliances and Online Advertising 
Table 4 lists Amazon.com’s announcements of promotional alliances. 
Amazon.com’s strategy in this area was to form alliances with firms that had popular web 
sites. The firms’ sites provide links to Amazon.com from their pages and promote 
Amazon.com’s products. The sites include Internet service providers, search engine 
firms, and other popular sites. These sites are often referred to as portals, which are sites 
that people visit first when they log on to the Internet. 
The null hypothesis that all of Amazon.com’s promotional alliances had no 
impact on its value is rejected at the 1% level (Wald test statistic 28.73, 1% critical value 
24.72). The estimated CAR of these events is .66. However, the biggest impact clearly 
occurs early on. The null hypothesis that promotional alliances after 9/8/97 had no impact 
on Amazon.com’s value cannot be rejected at the 10% level (Wald test statistic 8.18, 
10% critical value 13.36). The estimated CAR of these eight most recent promotional 
alliances is -.019, which suggests that they had essentially no effect on value. 
The main benefit of a promotional alliance is that it increases consumer awareness 
about the company’s products and services. This must be balanced against the cost of 
maintaining the alliance, which includes fees and transactions costs. A promotional 
alliance is basically an advertising and promotion contract combined with a long-run 
relationship. Consider Amazon.com’s alliance with Yahoo!, the popular search engine 
company. Yahoo! provides direct links to related Amazon.com book titles from every 
Yahoo! search result. Searchers are invited to buy books related to what they are   14 
searching for on the web. 
Table 4 shows that the alliances early on with the major portals AOL, Excite, and 
Yahoo! (7/7/97) generated a lot of value. Amazon.com also increased its value on 9/8/97 
by offering to pay high referral fees to the Top 500 PC Meter sites, the 500 most-visited 
sites on the web as measured by Media Metrix. More than 400,000 book titles were 
eligible for a 22.5% referral fee, and Amazon.com’s other titles were eligible for a 7.5% 
referral fee. These fees were 50% higher than the fees paid to other sites. 
After these early promotional alliances, the high benefits from additional 
promotional alliances disappeared. Note that by the end of 1998 Amazon.com essentially 
stopped this type of alliance formation. One recommendation for new e-commerce firms 
is that during their early development they should attempt to create alliances with major 
portal and search engine sites, the most-visited sites on the web. The major portals 
include AOL, MSN, and Yahoo!. 
It is worth noting that our results have implications for research on the effects of 
marketing alliances on firm value. Chauvin and Hirschey (1993) find that advertising 
intensity (measured as advertising as a percentage of sales) has a positive effect on firm 
value in advertising-intensive industries. Chan et al. (1997) and Das et al. (1998) find that 
technological alliances are more valuable than marketing alliances. Our results suggest 
that life cycle factors should be considered in such analyses because the value of a 
marketing alliance depends on how mature the firm is. 
Product Line Expansion and Service Improvement through Alliances or Acquisitions 
Table 5 lists Amazon.com’s announcements of product line expansion through alliances 
or acquisitions. Amazon.com’s strategy in this has consisted of aggressive product line   15 
expansion in areas where another e-commerce firm has already demonstrated 
competence. Table 6 lists Amazon.com’s announcements of services improvement 
through alliances or acquisitions. Amazon.com’s strategy in this category is difficult to 
summarize because it is made up of several strategies. It includes alliances for auctions, 
books, a credit card, delivery time improvements, free music downloads that allow 
consumers to sample music before purchasing, internationalization, and wireless access. 
  Although some of the effects in Table 5 are statistically significant on their own, 
we cannot reject the null hypothesis that, collectively, the events in Table 5 have no 
effect (Wald test statistic 16.69, 10% critical value 28.41). However, the point estimates 
suggest that the CAR of these events is positive: .58. The null hypothesis that all of the 
coefficients in Table 6 are insignificantly different from zero can be rejected at the 1% 
level (Wald test statistic 36.71, 1% critical value 29.14). However, this is only because of 
the alliance with Borders on 4/11/01. The hypothesis that the remaining effects are all 
zero cannot be rejected at the 10% level (Wald test statistic 15.86, 10% critical value 
21.07). The estimated CAR of the events in Table 6 is .62. 
  Product line expansion allows Amazon.com to reach additional consumers, sell 
more products to its existing consumers, and exploit economies of scope. These benefits 
must be weighed against the cost of maintaining the alliance or making the investment in 
the partner company. Only two types of events in Table 5 appear to have a substantial 
positive impact on value. First, Amazon.com’s large investment in Drugstore.com and its 
subsequent introduction of a health and beauty store in partnership with Drugstore.com 
(the first three events in Table 5) are associated with a CAR of .35. Second, 
Amazon.com’s introduction of Amazon.com Auctions (see 3/29/99) and the expansion of   16 
its auctions through alliances with five leading collectibles companies (11/5/99) and Greg 
Manning Auctions (2/3/00) are associated with a CAR of .50. The low or negative effects 
of the other products in Table 4 could be due to a variety of factors that we cannot 
distinguish between, including lack of consumer appeal, lack of synergies with 
Amazon.com’s other products and services, management’s unfamiliarity with the 
products, or excessive acquisition costs. 
  Table 6 shows that Amazon.com’s gains from service improvement can also be 
attributed primarily to two types of agreements. First, Amazon.com’s alliance with 
Bidpath, a leading Internet auction infrastructure firm (7/18/00), to improve 
Amazon.com’s auctions is associated with a CAR of .20. Internet auctions have proved to 
be quite popular, and the positive effect of improvements to Amazon.com’s auction 
capabilities reflects this. Second, Amazon.com’s recent alliance with Borders Group 
(4/11/01) is associated with a CAR of .52. Borders Group operates the second largest 
offline book retail chain in the United States, and its initial efforts to create an online 
bookstore failed. The alliance is extremely valuable because it combines Amazon.com’s 
online capabilities and resources with Borders’ offline strength. 
The other events in Table 6 are difficult to evaluate because either the estimates 
are imprecise or the evidence is mixed. For example, several events pertain to 
Amazon.com’s expansion of wireless access capabilities (10/4/99, 12/8/99, 2/28/00, 
3/15/00), and while the net impact appears to be negative (CAR -.17), the alliance with 
Sprint on 12/8/99 has a significant positive impact (CAR .23). 
Product Line Expansion and Service Improvement without Alliances or Acquisitions 
Table 7 lists Amazon.com’s announcements of product line expansion that did not   17 
involve partnership with any other firms. Amazon.com’s strategy in this area has 
consisted of expansion of its existing product lines and expansion into several new 
products. Table 8 lists Amazon.com’s announcements of service improvement that did 
not involve partnership with other firms. Amazon.com has added value that is hard to 
imitate. Its strategy has been to make shopping more convenient and informative (1-
Click, recommendations center, links to similar products, subject lists, purchase circles). 
Amazon.com’s introduction of z-Shops allows it to market its service capabilities without 
transferring its know-how. 
The null hypothesis that all of the coefficients in Table 7 are insignificantly 
different from zero is rejected at the 10% level (Wald test statistic 19.31, 10% critical 
value 18.55). If the two music store events are removed the hypothesis that the remaining 
coefficients in Table 7 are insignificantly different from zero cannot be rejected at the 
10% level (Wald test statistic 6.91, 10% critical value 15.99). However, the estimated 
CAR of these events is .81, which exceeds the CAR of the music store events by a 
considerable margin. The null hypothesis that all of the improvements in Table 8 had no 
impact on Amazon.com’s value is rejected at the 1% level (Wald test statistic 18.74, 1% 
critical value 16.81). The estimated CAR these events is .79. 
Table 7 shows that Amazon.com’s efforts at expanding its product lines without 
alliances or acquisitions have generally increased value. The largest value generators 
were the music store, the video store, the kitchen store, the children’s store, and the 
downloadable software store. 
Table 8 shows that improving the ease of shopping through devices like the 1-
Click payment feature and providing additional information to consumers through   18 
categorization, search capabilities, and recommendations on related books and music has 
generally increased value. Note that in contrast to the price reductions described above, 
these strategies are not so easy for Amazon.com’s competitors to imitate. For example, 
Amazon.com successfully obtained and defended a patent on its 1-Click payment 
technology. When Amazon.com expands its product line it tends to adapt its existing 
services like 1-Click shopping and recommendations to the new products. Therefore, 
there are economies of scope created when service improvements occur. Amazon.com’s 
zShops exploits these capabilities further by allowing others to make use of 
Amazon.com’s technologies. 
4. Conclusion 
This paper estimates the effects of Amazon.com’s e-commerce strategies on its value. 
Among the conclusions for e-commerce firms are the following: First, price competition 
and offline expansion should be avoided. Second, promotional alliances should focus on 
the most prominent portals and are most useful early in the company’s life. Third, 
product line expansion and service improvements, with or without alliances or 
acquisitions, should be pursued, but positive value may come from a small number of 
these. Amazon.com’s highest estimated abnormal return came from an alliance with 
Borders Group, an offline book retail giant that complements Amazon.com’s online 
strengths in book retailing. This suggests that one of the most fruitful strategies for online 
firms is to form alliances with offline firms in the same industry. 
  Stock prices for Internet firms often seem to fluctuate wildly for no reason, but 
the results show that even in this setting the market still responds to information. A final 
recommendation is that because the market reaction provides information for managers,   19 
firms that enter new volatile environments should 1) go public; 2) announce their 
competitive strategies in order to get the market’s reaction; and 3) spread out strategy 
announcements in order to isolate the market’s reaction to each one.
7 The previous 
literature concentrates primarily on the setting in which managers have private 
information relevant for valuing the firm and other market participants do not, but in new 
environments information is often widely held.
8 Managers may be able to use the 
market’s reaction to announcements to assist in formulating future strategies.  20 
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0Table 1. Pricing Strategies 






6/10/97  Announces lower prices on books. For more than 400,000 titles, every hardcover is at 





11/21/97  Announces lower prices on audiobooks, calendars, and some books. More than 30,000 
audiobooks are discounted 30%, more than 1,000 calendars are discounted 20%, and 





5/17/99  Announces 50% discounts on all New York Times bestsellers. 
The Wall Street Journal reports that Barnes & Noble and Borders match 
Amazon.com’s discounts the next day. (On 5/18 Amazon.com acquires 35 percent of 





5/8/00  Announces Bid for Featured Placement, which allows sellers to bid for placements on 
















Announces the Honor system, which allows online visitors to tip their favorite sites 
 
 
Announces a new free music downloads area with MP3 and Liquid Audio files – 












In all of the tables: 
 
An “a” beside the coefficient in the first column indicates that the event window overlaps with the window of 
another event 
 
* significant at the 10% level 
** significant at the 5% level 
*** significant at the 1% level  23 
Table 2. Domestic Customer Service Center, Distribution Center, and Regional Expansion 






11/18/97  Opens a 200,000 square foot distribution center in New Castle, Delaware – 





1/7/99  Opens a new highly mechanized 322,560 square foot distribution center in Fernley, 
Nevada that will reduce shipping times to key markets in the western United States by 





4/13/99  Will open a 460,000 square foot distribution center in Coffeyville, Kansas. The center 
is leased. (On 4/12 Amazon.com agrees to purchase LiveBid.com, the sole provider of 





5/25/99  Will open two distribution centers in Kentucky: 570,000 and 600,000 square feet, 





6/8/99  Will open a 800,000 square foot highly mechanized Georgia distribution center. The 









11/11/99  Will expand its Grand Forks customer service center acquired from Tool Crib of the 









Will open a customer service center in Huntington, West Virginia. The center will be 
owned and operated by a subsidiary of Amazon.com. 
 















Table 3. Foreign Customer Service Center, Distribution Center, and Regional Expansion 












Acquires Bookpages, one of the largest online bookstores in the United Kingdom, and 
Telebook, Germany’s number one online bookstore. Both are expected to be important 
for Amazon.com’s expansion into Europe. (Also acquires the Internet Movie Database, 
which will support Amazon.com’s entry into online video sales) 
 
Enters the European book market by launching new web sites in Germany and the 
United Kingdom: Amazon.de and Amazon.co.uk. Amazon.de has a customer service 
and distribution center in Regensburg, Germany, and Amazon.co.uk has a customer 



















8/29/00  Launches Amazon.fr, a French-language site (Amazon.com also announces an 





11/1/00  Launches Amazon.co.jp, a Japanese-language site  .051 
(.44) 
.051 
(.46)   24 
Table 4. Promotional Alliances and Online Advertising 






7/7/97  Yahoo!: Amazon.com will be the premier bookseller featured on Yahoo!, with direct 
links from Yahoo searches to related books at Amazon.com. 
 
Excite: Amazon.com will make a multi-million dollar advertising buy on Excite and 
will become Excite’s exclusive bookseller integrated throughout Excite’s channels. 
 
AOL (on 7/8/97): Begins a three-year comprehensive promotional agreement under 
which Amazon.com will be the exclusive bookseller on AOL.com and AOL’s NetFind 
search engine. In return AOL will receive $19 million over three years with the 












9/8/97  Premium associates: Amazon.com offers the Top 500 PC Meter sites referral fees for 















11/10/97  @Home Network: Amazon.com will be the premier bookseller throughout @Home 









4/7/98  iVillage.com: Amazon.com will be the exclusive bookseller throughout the 





7/21/98  Intuit: Amazon.com will be Quicken.com’s exclusive bookseller in the United States, 
and the preferred bookseller in the United Kingdom and Germany (Amazon.com also 
confirms that it has an agreement with Compaq to feature Amazon.com in Compaq’s 





9/2/98  Yahoo!: Amazon.com expands its relationship with Yahoo! and is now the premier 





2/14/00  LookSmart, a global leader of Internet search infrastructure: Amazon.com will be the 





 Table 5. Product Line Expansion through Alliances or Acquisitions 


















Drugstore.com: Amazon.com owns 46% of Drugstore.com 
  
 
Drugstore.com: Amazon.com will invest $30 million, own 28% of the company, and add 
Drugstore.com’s products in return for $105 million over three years (On 1/21 Amazon.com 
acquires 5% of Greenlight.com, an online car-buying service, and will receive $82.5 million over 
five years and warrants to increase its stake as much as 30% and add its products) 
 
Amazon.com launches a health and beauty store with Drugstore.com (On 4/18 Amazon.com 
announces it has invested $30 million in WineShopper.com in 1999) 
 































Pets.com: Amazon.com will acquire 50% of Pets.com (On 3/30 Amazon.com opens 
Amazon.com Auctions) 
 











4/26/99  Exchange.com: Amazon.com acquires Exchange.com, adding more than twelve million rare 
books and music items, and has agreements to acquire Accept.com and Alexa Internet, two 










12/1/99  Ashford.com, the leading Internet retailer of luxury products: Amazon.com will invest $10 
million to own 16.6% of Asford.com, and add Ashford.com’s products (On 11/30 Amazon.com 



















Living.com, a home living store: Amazon.com will acquire 18% of Living.com, with warrants 
for another 9%, and will make Living.com the exclusive Amazon.com Home Living Store in 
return for $145 million over five years (On 1/31 Amazon.com will acquire 5% of Audible.com, a 
spoken audio content firm, and will add Audible.com’s products. In return Amazon.com will 
receive $30 million dollars over three years) 
 
Living.com: Amazon.com launches its home living store 
 
 
Audible.com: Amazon.com expands spoken audio content and has more than 4,700 audiobooks. 
It also expands speeches, lectures, and other material (also deepens its Internet infrastructure 
alliance with HP) 
 































2/3/00  Greg Manning Auctions: Amazon.com owns $5 million of the company’s stock and will offer its 









3/28/00  eZiba.com, a leading online retailer of handcrafted products: Amazon.com has invested $17.5 






8/10/00  Toysrus.com, an online toy retailer: to create a co-branded toy and video games store. 
Amazon.com will receive a combination of periodic fixed payments, per unit payments and a 













4/24/01  All-Clad Metalcrafters, a kitchenware firm: Amazon.com will launch an All-Clad store within its 




(.44) Table 6. Service Improvements through Alliances or Acquisitions 






8/4/98  PlanetAll, which provides a web-based address book, calendar, and reminder service, 
and Junglee, which provides web-based virtual database technology: Amazon.com will 





4/20/99  Sarah McLachlan, a major recording artist, Nettwerk/Arista Records, a music 
distribution company, and Liquid Audio, a streaming audio software firm: 
Amazon.com becomes the first Internet retailer to offer free digital downloads to 
promote an upcoming release by a major recording artist (Sarah McLachlan). 














Sotheby’s: Sotheby’s and Amazon.com will launch a joint online auction site for 
collectibles and general art and antiques – authenticated and guaranteed products. 
Amazon.com will purchase shares and warrants in Sotheby’s worth $45 million. 
 
Launches Sothebys.amazon.com, an online auction site 
 
 
Sothebys.com and Sothebys.amazon.com will combine into one online auction site 



















10/4/99  Convergence Corporation, a software firm specializing in Internet access from 
different appliances: Amazon.com has acquired Convergence Corporation in exchange 
for shares worth $20 million to help it launch Amazon.com Anywhere, which provides 





12/8/99  Sprint: Amazon.com and Sprint will offer Internet shopping from Internet-ready Sprint 





2/18/00  Basis Technology, a provider of internationalization technology: Amazon.com makes 















3/20/00  Kozmo.com, the leading Internet-to-door delivery service: Amazon.com invests $60 
million in Kozmo.com, has warrants to acquire more, and intends to introduce 1-hour 









7/10/00  FedEx: Amazon.com and FedEx deliver 250,000 copies of the new Harry Potter book 









4/11/01  Borders Group, one of the largest Book Superstores: Amazon.com will provide the e-
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Table 7. Product Line Expansion without Alliances or Acquisitions 






3/2/98  Introduces Amazon.com Kids with a catalogue of over 100,000 books for children, 









Announces launch of music store with over 125,000 titles 
 
 















7/13/99  Opens Electronics and Toys and Games Stores (On 7/14 Amazon.com announces that 



















Opens four new stores: 
1) Home  Improvement 
2) Software 
3) Video  Games 
4) Gift  Ideas 
 
(Also acquires Tool Crib of the North, a leading tools and equipment catalog 
company) 
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Table 8. Service Improvements without Alliances or Acquisitions 












Introduces three new features: 
1) Recommendations  center 
2) Subject-browsing  areas 
3) 1-Click  ordering 
 
Improves the music recommendations center by adding more categories. (On 3/10 















2/9/99  Will list which feature placements on its site are paid for and which are not (Also will 
implement a new book-return policy that allows books to be returned even after they 









Introduces purchase circles, the location-specific bestseller lists 
 
 











9/30/99  Launches three innovations: 
1)  zShops enables anyone to offer merchandise for sale at Amazon.com 
2)  Amazon.com Payments allows individuals and firms to accept payments 
through the 1-Click payment feature 
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1 1-Click ordering speeds up shopping times by reducing the number of mouse clicks and downloaded pages 
required to purchase products. In the standard “shopping cart” approach, the customer must click on each product 
and then download a new page to confirm purchases with additional clicks. 1-Click removes the necessity to use a 
shopping cart – once Amazon.com obtains the customer’s payment and shipping information the customer can 
purchase products with a single click. Amazon.com’s Recommendations Centers allow customers to post their 
reviews of products on Amazon.com’s web pages. As an information-enhancing device, the recommendations 
centers give Amazon.com an advantage over other web retailers and offline retailers. Amazon.com’s zShops 
allows other businesses and individuals to offer products for sale through Amazon.com, which allows others to use 
Amazon.com’s services. 
2 Several other studies exist, but these are the most closely related to our work. For a partial review see 
McWilliams and Siegel (1997). They critically review the 29 event studies that were published during 1986-95 in 
the three top management journals Academy of Management Journal, Strategic Management Journal, and Journal 
of Management. Some of these studies, such as Woolridge and Snow (1990), examine several categories of 
strategies. 
3 We considered examining other less prominent online firms such as BN.com and CD-Now, but these firms have 
not been as diligent at announcing strategies and have received much less press coverage than Amazon.com. 
Therefore, we restrict our attention to Amazon.com. 
4 In contrast, the standard deviation of the S&P 500 returns during the sample period is .013. 
5 As a robustness check we allowed α and β to change every time Method 1 yielded a CAR that was significant at 
the 5% level. The null hypothesis that α and β are constant during the sample period cannot be rejected at the 10% 
level of significance (Wald test statistic .0055, 10% critical value 25.99). Further, no substantial changes in the 
sign or magnitudes of the CARs occurred when we allowed α and β to change. 
6 Price reductions may appear to be easily reversed, but this is often not the case partly because competitors react   30 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
by lowering their own prices. Further, price reductions are usually publicized in order to maximize their effect, so 
they cannot be reversed without inducing a loss of reputation amongst consumers. Therefore, the firm cannot 
return to the initial state of the world simply by raising prices. 
7 Gennotte and Trueman (1996) examine the strategic timing of corporate disclosures and suggest that multiple 
announcements should be spread out over time if the manager believes that announcements have positive 
implications for value. However, they assume that the manager is at least as well informed as other market 
participants, so they do not analyze how the manager can use announcements to learn from trading. Diamond and 
Verrecchia (1981) explore how investors can learn from trading. 
8 Of course, it is possible that the manager’s private information dominates the public’s information. Jennings and 
Mazzeo (1991) provide evidence that suggests that managers do not change the terms of mergers and acquisitions 
when the market responds unfavorably to announcements. However, this result could be due to agency problems 
that result from the separation of ownership and control in large corporations. In contrast, many firms that enter 
new environments are entrepreneurial startups in which the Chief Executive Officer has a significant equity stake. 
In new environments learning from experience is important. For example, Anand and Khanna (2000) provide 
evidence that firms learn through experience how to create value through alliance formation. The market reaction 
to announcements provides information that could inform this learning process. 